Whooshup Reorganization

To reflect what this blog has become, the format has changed to emphasize the enormous number of useful links to resources we provide. To go to the whooshup blog and conversations about these resources, just scroll to the bottom of the lists of resources!

Thursday, August 27, 2009

Campbell, Dreyfus & Searle to mix it up in PodiCast Triple "Header"

Theory of Meaning[Campbell] http://webcast.berkeley.edu/course_details_new.php?seriesid=2009-D-67289&semesterid=2009-D

Existentialism in Lit & Film [Dreyfus] http://webcast.berkeley.edu/course_details_new.php?seriesid=2009-D-67124&semesterid=2009-D

Philosophy of Society [Searle] http://webcast.berkeley.edu/course_details_new.php?seriesid=2009-D-67309&semesterid=2009-D

5 comments:

foundrysmith said...

No Hits, No Runs, One Error, they already screwed up the first Campbell podcast

BH said...

Maybe that is why some philosophers and their followers are so troubled by technology: they can't figure out how to use it!

foundrysmith said...

In the first available podcast, Prof. Searle opened up with an account of the distinction between the objective and subjective. In his analysis, these terms can be further modified as either ontologic or epistemic. The crucial concept given is that an "...ontological subjectivity of a domain does not prevent an epistemic objective account...", Searle gave a good lecture, I think this is going to be a very interesting class!

Professor Dreyfus opened up another Philosophy 7 course, audio quality is pretty good. I only made it through Kierkegaard last time I listened in, maybe this time I will make it all the way through!

Still hoping for good things with professor Campbell, we'll wait and see!

SCORE: Searle and Dreyfus both score base hits at the bottom of week one for two hits, no runs. and one error . We'll see what gets posted over the weekend

foundrysmith said...

I have been thinking about the statement made by prof. Searle in his first lecture ("...ontological subjectivity of a domain does not prevent an epistemic objective account..."), where he prefaces an "ontologic" or "epistemic" sense to the subjective or objective characterization of a something-or-other ( be it observer relative or observer independent). For example, he maintains that mountains are ontologically objective, whereas pain would be ontologically subjective - the birthdate of Rembrandt is epistemically objective, but whether Rembrandt is a better painter than Rubens is epistemically subjective. Even though these statements may be true, isn't it derivative to what Heidegger was getting at when he spoke of a "kind of being" in B&T ? Looking at Section 10, the bottom paragraph of page 75 (M&R) has a different way of putting this, going the other way "...(the) ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material..." I take this to mean that although there may be nothing to prevent an epistemic objective account, it isn't going to help any with the ontology of the domain either. Only one lecture in, we seem to be referring to "Dasein" obliquely, "present-at-hand" directly, I am not clear if there is a "ready-to-hand" that can be described with Searle's terminology, or if it's even part of the picture?

Karl Tyson said...

Excellent comment Dean. I can't defend or explain Searle; and I can't improve Heidegger, or your brief but telling exposition of his essential dissent on this important area. Maybe someone else can?